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a bstr act  I present and evaluate various criticisms against the view that 
architecture and architectural value are to be understood solely in terms of 
internal space. I conclude that the architectural value of a building should not 
be limited to its internal spatial effects because the value of other elements, 
such as (non­spatial) function, materials, ornamentation, and so on cannot 
all be reduced to spatial values.
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Aesthetic Value
The idea of a connection between architecture and space is intuitive and 
has appealed to many architects and art critics.1 After all, the function of 
architecture seems to be ‘to create places and contexts in which social life 
goes on’.2 Space has also been taken as the proper medium of architec-
ture as an art.3 However, the nature of the relation between architecture 
and space raises a number of philosophical questions. Can we define 
architecture in terms of space? Are architectural value and architectural 
understanding related to space? What conception of space is at issue in 
this relation? One influential view, suggested by Bruno Zevi, is that space 
is essential for both the definition and appreciation of architecture. In 
what follows, I first present two naive definitions of architecture in terms 
of space and then introduce and clarify Zevi’s view. I then present a num-
ber of objections to the view that have been raised by Roger Scruton and 
add critical remarks of my own. Finally, I argue that considerations of 
space in the experience, definition, and evaluation of architecture are 
certainly important, but that space cannot be taken as the principal and 
fundamental parameter of architectural value.
Space and the Essence of Architecture
The concept of space can be related to a general definition of architecture, 
to what constitutes the success of an architectural design, to a general 
conception of architectural experience, to architectural value, and so on. 
As may be surmised, all these concepts are interconnected.
A first rough definition of architectural art in terms of space runs as 
follows:
(D1) Something is an architectural work of art if, and only if, the 
content of an appropriate experience of it, as what it is, necessarily 
includes an experience of space. 
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Taken literally, this definition seems false and not interesting. The mere 
experience of space is clearly not sufficient for something to be a work of 
architecture. Standing in an open field or climbing a mountain involves 
an experience of space, but open fields and mountains are not works of 
architecture. The main problem of D1 is that it does not seem to account 
for the existence of basic architectural elements: walls, roofs and so on. 
D1 can be qualified and improved:
(D2) Something is an architectural work of art if, and only if, the content 
of an appropriate experience of it, as what it is, necessarily includes 
an experience of enclosed space.
According to this definition, the key concept for a definition of architecture 
is not space as such, but rather enclosed space.4 However, D2 does not seem 
to capture other essential elements of what we appreciate in buildings qua 
works of architecture. More specifically, as Scruton claims regarding a 
similar definition, it does not take into account such important features 
as effects of light and shade, ornament, function, texture, and mouldings. 
These elements can hardly be excluded from the appreciation of a build-
ing; hence, they need to be accommodated in a definition of architecture.5
Zevi defined architecture in terms of a conception of space that also 
includes an account of these other elements. He distinguished two kinds 
of space: the internal and the external (or urban) space. The former is com-
pletely determined by the building itself, while the latter is determined by 
a particular building and its surroundings.6 According to him, only the 
form er is relevant to a judgement of architectural success. In his clarifica-
tion of the concept of space, Zevi relied on Sigfried Giedion’s interpretation 
of the history of architecture as a succession of different spatial concep-
tions.7 Without going into unnecessary detail, Giedion and Zevi argued, 
among other things, that Cubism is a crucial point in the development of 
the conception of space in art. According to them, Cubism breaks with 
traditional perspective in the sense that, for example, Picasso and Braque 
represent objects from several perspectives at once, instead of from a 
simple privileged point of view, in contrast to what had been done before 
them.8 Giedion also claimed that the Cubist representation of objects, char-
acterized by the simultaneous presence of several points of view, some-
how introduced into the consciousness of modern man something that 
was suggested in the emerging scientific discoveries of Albert Einstein: 
simultaneity.9 Leaving aside fanciful connections between Cubism and the 
Theory of Relativity, what is meant here is simply that the so-called dimen-
sion of space cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account a 
On Architecture as a Spatial Art
55
temporal element, that is, the time required to explore the internal space 
of the building. In other terms, in order to appreciate the internal space of 
a building, we need time to move inside it.10 This temporal aspect of the 
perception of space implies a multiplicity of different spatial experiences 
generated by the same building: the possible paths taken by different ob-
servers to explore, for example, a medieval church can always be different 
from each other. Summing up, Zevi suggested that the conception of space 
that is relevant to architecture is of an internal space that requires move-
ment (and direct acquaintance) to be perceived and appreciated.
In addition to having offered a clarification of the notion of space, Zevi 
showed himself to be aware of the difficulties faced by D1 and D2. For 
instance, against D1, he denied that the spatial value of a building is its 
sole value and acknowledged that a work of architecture can be evalu-
ated from different perspectives. However, he also claimed that, if we 
want to value a building from an architectural point of view, the spatial 
aspect is to be taken as a frame of reference against which other ele-
ments can be understood. In other words, we should always refer to the 
spatial value when we evaluate a building even from different points of 
view, if we want to understand its architectural value.11 More specifically, 
Zevi claimed that, even though details, ornament, function, and so on are 
criteria of evaluation, they cannot be considered as independent from 
their spatial value: their architectural value is always to be understood 
in terms of the spatial value they have in the context of the building. 
For example, the ornamentation (and other non-spatial features) should 
be considered as relevant to the architectural value of a building to the 
extent that it provides a better clarification or experience of its spatial 
effect. Similarly, the architectural value of other kinds of detail should 
be understood in terms of the role they play in determining the spatial 
effect of the composition. What is proper and central in an architectural 
work of art is a meaningful creation of space through limitations, and 
other features should be understood, if relevant to an architectural evalu-
ation, as details that influence the spatial value of the composition.
In light of the foregoing, we may present the following definition of 
architecture: 
(DZ) Something is an architectural work of art if, and only if, the content 
of an appropriate experience of it, as what it is, necessarily includes 
an experience of internal space (in the defined sense), and its other 
elements (ornamentation, lighting, materials, and so on) promote 
the spatial effect via a process of meaningful limitations.12
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Architectural success (or beauty) is to be seen in terms of how the inter-
nal space affects us: ‘Beautiful architecture would then be architecture in 
which the internal space attracts us, elevates us and dominates us spiritu-
ally. No work lacking internal space can be considered architecture.’13 An 
architectural judgement, that is, a judgement on a building as a work of 
architecture, is fundamentally a judgement about its internal space (as 
previously defined).14 The overall value of a building is not to be reduced 
to its spatial value; however, the architectural value of a building must be 
assessed in relation to its spatial value.15
Objections
According to DZ, the details of a building have an architectural inter-
est to the extent that they emphasize or clarify spatial elements. For in-
stance, an internal cornice in St Peter’s has architectural value because 
‘it brings the space of the wall to an effective conclusion, and defines 
thereby the hidden geometry of the roof cavity’.16 The above elaboration 
of Zevi’s remarks on architecture in terms of space succeeds if it shows 
that each detail of an architectural composition can be seen as having a 
bearing on the internal space of the building. In this section, I will first 
introduce, elaborate and evaluate Scruton’s objections to this account 
and then advance other criticisms.
Scruton’s first objection to Zevi’s account is based on the nature of 
the builder’s material. Scruton claims that certain works of architecture 
would lose their architectural significance if they had been built using 
materials other than those from which they were actually constructed. 
For example, the colonnades at St. Spirito in Florence would lose archi-
tectural significance if they had been built in wood or granite, instead 
of pietra serena (grey sandstone or serene stone). The point is that the 
materials from which an architectural work is constructed influences the 
value, experience, and judgement of it qua work of architecture and this 
influence cannot be thought of as being merely a function of the spatial 
effect that different materials have on the perceiver. Suppose that the 
spatial effect of the colonnades at St. Spirito would be unaffected by the 
substitution of its colonnades in pietra serena with a similar material. 
According to Scruton, the resulting architectural experience would be 
deprived of the aesthetic pleasure derived from the beauty of the origi-
nal material; hence, the particular technical choice of a specific material 
should be considered as aesthetically relevant.
We may also add that, in virtue of our knowledge of the particular sig-
nificance that pietra serena has in the history of architecture in Tuscany, 
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the material from which the colonnades of St. Spirito were constructed is 
an element of architectural interest because awareness of its significance 
affects and possibly enhances the architectural experience of the work. 
This enhancement cannot be understood in purely spatial terms and has 
a clear aesthetic and artistic relevance. Therefore, the material is signifi-
cant for the architectural value of a work and this value is not prima facie 
related to space. 
This objection, which was not advanced by Scruton, requires other 
premises. For instance, it presupposes a notion of architectural experi-
ence and appreciation (or, more generally, of aesthetic experience and 
appreciation) according to which knowledge of relevant background fea-
tures of a work of art influences its related experience and appreciation.17 
This view is accepted by many contemporary philosophers of art and 
does not constitute a prima facie reason to resist the argument. The fore-
going reasoning is also orthogonal to the contemporary dialectic on the 
Acquaintance Principle (AP) for aesthetic judgements.18 Roughly speak-
ing, the AP implies that aesthetic knowledge has to be acquired through 
an adequately specified relation of acquaintance between the perceiver 
and the object. In the previous argument, it is not necessary to maintain 
that our knowledge of the material in question is an element that has a 
direct bearing on the experience of the work in order for that material 
to be judged as aesthetically valuable. For example, if pressed on this 
point, we can adopt an anti-empiricist view of the value of architecture 
and argue that non-experiential features of a work are also relevant for 
its evaluation.19 In our case, we can say that the technical achievements 
of an architect in constructing a building are themselves an architectural 
value. My point is that the (non-spatial) importance of the material for 
the architectural value of a building can be supported either (1) by as-
suming that our knowledge of the significance of the material influences 
our aesthetic experience and that aesthetic judgments should be based 
on an adequately qualified acquaintance with the object of experience 
or (2) by adopting an anti-empiricist view of the value of architecture. 
According to this latter position, the significance of the material does not 
have to be relevant for the experience of the work in order to be consid-
ered as valuable.
Zevi may reply that the objection presupposes that the architectural 
value of a building is influenced by considerations related to the mate-
rial employed and that this presupposition has not received sufficient 
justification. However, it seems highly plausible that the choice of differ-
ent materials by the architect (or the engineers) affects our architectural 
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experience and judgements of value on buildings (whether directly per-
ceived or not) and that this is not related only to its spatial effects. In sup-
port of this view, it must be remembered that architecture is influenced 
greatly by the evolution of technology, and that one way of appreciating 
a building as a work of art is to evaluate the way in which certain techno-
logical solutions have been applied to practical and aesthetic problems. 
Besides, knowledge of materials and their use is considered an important 
skill that is necessary for the formation of architects. For example, the 
ability and skill displayed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe in choosing and 
combining the materials for the construction of the Seagram Building is 
widely considered an architectural merit.20
Another objection raised by Scruton to the possibility of reducing ar-
chitectural experience to spatial experience is based on the distinction 
between carved and modelled form. Scruton suggests that Leon Battista 
Alberti’s Tempio Malatestiano in Rimini is beautiful from an architec-
tural point of view, not only because of the rhythm of the arcade, but 
also in virtue of ‘the quality of workmanship which can be seen in its 
finely sculpted lines’.21 If Agostino di Duccio’s and Matteo de’ Pasti’s fine 
decorations were moulded into concrete, they would lose much of their 
capacity to elicit emotive responses and, as a result, our experience of 
the building would change. Zevi can reply to this objection by saying 
that these details, along with the gargoyles that adorn the Notre Dame 
de Paris cathedral or the sculptures of mythical tiger-headed fish on the 
Himeji Castle (姫路城), are certainly to be taken as artistically valuable, 
but they are not part of the architectural value of the buildings in which 
they are located. In particular, they may increase the overall artistic val-
ue of the building in virtue of their inner qualities as sculptures, but 
they are not to be considered as architectural elements. However, Zevi’s 
observation presupposes the definition of the essence of architecture 
which is in question. In particular, Zevi’s remarks simply remind us that 
architecture deals essentially with internal space and that all those other 
features that do not play a role in determining spatial effect may increase 
the artistic value of a building but not its architectural merits. 
To convince a spatial theorist of architecture that her theory is not 
persuasive regarding the lack of architectural merit of decorative ele-
ments, we may appeal to a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
ornamentation. Intuitively, there seems to be a distinction between at 
least two kinds of ornamentation in works of architecture. While we 
think that some of the decorative elements inside a building are relevant 
or important to its appreciation, we do not think that all are. For in-
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stance, we do not think that the Uffizi Gallery in Florence is architectur-
ally more valuable in virtue of the masterpieces that hang on its walls. 
Botticelli’s La Primavera or Titian’s Venus of Urbino are extrinsic decora-
tions of the internal space of the Uffizi. In contrast, the cortile (internal 
courtyard) of the building is articulated through a Doric order that some 
architectural historians, such as Giedion, judge to result in a ‘masterpiece 
of perspective in depth’.22 Similarly, the statues that fill the niches in the 
piers contribute to the creation of the atmosphere that surrounds the gal-
lery. Removing these statues would certainly change one’s architectural 
experience of the building. These details, in contrast to the paintings 
hanging on the walls, are better seen as elements that are intrinsic to the 
architectural composition.23 It may be thus argued that, if we adopt DZ, 
we cannot formulate a proper distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
ornamentation because, on the view expressed by DZ, every sculptural 
detail is external and thus not an architectural element (unless it pro-
vides a spatial effect). If this is the case, then, in adopting DZ, we lose the 
theoretical possibility of describing a series of interesting architectural 
features, a possibility that seems to clarify our understanding of certain 
buildings.
Scruton also advances an objection to the spatial idiom in architectur-
al criticism: he claims that the concept of space can be eliminated from 
most critical writings without substantially modifying their content.24 
Scruton rewrites two passages of Paul Frankl’s Principles of Architectural 
History in such a way that the notion of space is eliminated without loss 
of content.25 However, Scruton does not provide a systematic way of re-
placing the notion of space. In some cases, such a demand may be too 
severe. However, in this case it seems fair, given the extensive use of 
the notion of space in recent architectural criticism. Nevertheless, even 
if all spatial idioms can be replaced by text that does not refer to space, 
it seems too strong to demand that they should be so replaced. After all, 
even if not fundamental or essential, descriptions in terms of spatial ef-
fects are important for the understanding of the role of certain details.26
DZ, with its related cluster of aesthetic concepts, does not adequately 
take into account other aspects that are usually taken as being essential 
to architecture as an art. One of them is the notion of a function that is 
independent of spatial considerations.27 A building that fails to operate 
under certain functional constraints, for example a house in which it is 
impossible to live, is an architectural failure.28 This suggestion is widely 
shared by many other architectural theorists and philosophers, even 
by those who do not take functional constraints as the sole criterion by 
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which to evaluate a building from an architectural point of view. In addi-
tion, functional constraints are usually taken as being characterising ele-
ments of architecture, because they are generally considered crucial for 
distinguishing architecture from, for example, sculpture. Function is an 
essential element but not exclusive or unique: architectural success and 
value cannot be understood as merely a matter of satisfying a function. 
Given the foregoing, we may wonder whether functional aspects that 
are not restricted to space can be somehow vindicated in DZ by reduc-
ing them to spatial effects. Is it plausible to maintain that all functional 
constraints should be seen in terms of their spatial effects? I think not; 
in fact, the opposite view is true for a great part of the built environ-
ment: frequently we can understand the spatial effects of a building in 
virtue of our knowledge of its function, but not the other way round. For 
instance, we can make sense of the spatial arrangement of a church and 
the emphasis that is usually put on the position of the altar in virtue of 
the function of churches as places in which a ceremony is performed. 
This ceremony (a non-spatial function) requires that the attention of the 
worshippers converges on a specific point. A spatial effect that invites 
or suggests movement towards the altar is better understood in virtue 
of its (non-spatial) function, not the other way round. If this is the case, 
the primacy of space for architectural understanding is, again, seriously 
threatened.29
Another objection to DZ is that the related notion of architectural suc-
cess cannot be evaluated solely in terms of internal space. Buildings that 
do not show any understanding of the environment in which they are 
built are more likely to be considered architectural failures (and con-
versely, showing an understanding of the surrounding environment is 
generally considered a good-making feature of a building). This does not 
mean that buildings must always harmonize with what surrounds them; 
certain buildings have been built in certain areas precisely with the aim 
of creating a contrast with a specific context. Think of buildings such as 
the modern complex of Langham Place in Mong Kok, Hong Kong. Lang-
ham Place was built in an area surrounded with old edifices of dubious 
aesthetic value with the precise aim of creating a contrast with the built 
environment and possibly increasing the value of the area through its 
presence. The good-making feature at issue is thus that a building should 
display an understanding of the environment in which it is located. 
Zevi’s account cannot accommodate this idea because he understands 
architectural success solely in terms of internal space.30
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Conclusions
In the preceding sections, I presented and evaluated various criticisms 
against the view that the essence of architecture is internal space. I con-
cluded that the architectural value of a building should not be limited to 
its internal spatial effects because the value of other elements, such as 
(non-spatial) function, materials, ornamentation, and so on cannot all be 
reduced to spatial values. As a consequence, the interconnected network 
of definitions of some of the key concepts in the aesthetics of architecture 
should be correspondingly revised in order to take into account the com-
plexity of architectural art.
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